New Figures Reveal Industrial Gains
The New York Times, January 31, 1960, Section E, Page 4
The material is published in a condensed form. Link to original article
Last week, analysts compared economic reports from Moscow and Beijing for 1959.
According to official statistics, the rate of economic growth in Communist China significantly outpaces the Soviet Union’s, with China’s advantage over the USSR in industrial production growth comparable to the Soviet Union’s advantage over the United States.
The reliability of these statistics remains an open question, especially given that China previously acknowledged that it had greatly exaggerated the scale of the “Great Leap Forward” of 1958. Nevertheless, Beijing’s claimed successes in 1959 appear more substantiated than the figures from the previous year.
Assuming statistical comparability, in 1959 Beijing reported a 31% increase in total industrial and agricultural production, while Moscow reported an 8% increase in national income.
China’s industrial growth rate now significantly exceeds the rate achieved by the Soviet economy at the same stage of development (the late 1920s).
China’s overall industrial production, particularly heavy industry, also exceeds the Soviet Union’s level in the early 1930s.
Analysts identify four key factors that contributed to China’s superior economic development rate over the USSR:
First, the very existence of the USSR and other communist countries, which provided China with significant assistance in the form of equipment, technology, and specialists.
China received far more support from its allies than the USSR received from capitalist countries at a comparable stage of development in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
China was able to learn from the mistakes made by other communist bloc countries.
The second factor was the Chinese communists’ establishment of strict discipline among the population much more quickly and at a lower cost than Lenin and Stalin had managed.
In the USSR, collectivization took about fifteen years and was accompanied by the loss of half of agricultural capital due to peasant resistance.
China, however, collected agricultural resources almost instantly, within just five years of coming to power, and then introduced the people’s commune system without encountering the stubborn resistance Stalin encountered.
Third, China had far more human resources than the USSR.
Beijing’s success stems from its ability to employ over 600 million people with unprecedented intensity and minimal pay.
Probably never in history have so many people worked so hard for such meager pay as in China over the past decade.
Fourth, the Chinese communists benefited from a later start to industrialization, when global technological advances were higher than in Russia in the 1920s and 1930s.
Modern Chinese factories, recently built, are much more productive per unit of invested capital than enterprises built in Russia thirty or more years ago.
Looking ahead, factors favorable to China remain strong, and there’s a chance that high rates of economic growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace.
Likely, within this decade, China will become the world’s third-largest industrial power, surpassing any Western European country.
This is achievable if China doubles its industrial output within ten years, which at its current rate could take only about three years.
If China’s rapid growth in economic power continues in the coming years, it will radically alter the global balance of power and have significant consequences.
This is especially significant for the Soviet Union. As Beijing strengthens, it will likely become less dependent on Soviet economic aid, reducing the effectiveness of this key lever of influence for Moscow.
At the same time, China may begin to more assertively demand greater influence over decisions shared by the entire communist bloc.
For the United States and the non-communist world, the prospects for a rapid rise of communist China are unattractive.
China, rapidly gaining economic power, will likely strengthen communist influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The Chinese model may begin to be perceived by leaders of underdeveloped countries as an effective solution to the challenge of rapid industrialization.
Military power is growing alongside economic power. It is likely that long before the end of this decade, China will become a modern military power with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
Of course, all these forecasts are speculative. There’s no guarantee that Beijing will maintain its grip on the people with the same success.
Nevertheless, China’s industrial dynamism in recent years has already forced many world capitals, including Washington and Moscow, to reconsider their views on the future.
