NYT – Saturday, September 30, 1939 – Page numbers 1, 5
RUSSIANS WORRIED
People Fear They Are to Be Dragged Into War by New Nazi Links
BUT NEUTRALS DIFFER
Blow to Reich Is Seen in Deal — Berlin Is Held to Confess Weakness
By G. E. R. GEDYE
Wireless to The New York Times.
MOSCOW, Sept. 29 — It was after two days of hard negotiating by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop of Germany that the Moscow wireless announced this morning to alarmed citizens the conclusion of the pact of friendship with a hereditary enemy, Fascist Germany. This pact and the accompanying German-Soviet declaration aroused in the people a fear that they were about to be dragged into war.
At the same time the letter of Premier-Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff to Herr von Ribbentrop concerning the intensification of commercial relations was published, and throughout the day queues of worried citizens — this correspondent saw more than one line at least a quarter mile long-awaited copies of the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, which would confirm their worst anxieties. On all sides one heard disturbed Russians discussing the situation.
“Does it mean war?” ran a typical comment. “The Germans are fascist enemies of the Communist people. How is it true that they are friends of ours? We know better than to trust them.”
Others Also Pessimistic
Not only Russians were made despondent by the new pact, with its declaration that liquidation of the war between Germany and the Anglo-French Allies corresponded to the interests of all peoples and that the Nazi and Soviet powers would consult each other on “the necessary measures” should the Allies refuse to lower their colors. The news confirmed in their belief those who have all along maintained that at, or even before, the first visit of Herr von Ribbentrop to Moscow the whole scheme of the partition of Poland, including a full German-Soviet military alliance, had been settled.
This view, however, seems quite unsupportable when the known facts are examined carefully. The theory is obliged to leave out of account the secret mobilization of Soviet forces, of which the Germans are known not to have had any advance idea; the sudden invasion of the Polish Ukraine and Western White Russia; the subsequent concession to the Soviet of a vast area of purely Polish territory, including even suburbs of Warsaw; the present withdrawal of the Soviet claim to that line before it was even fully reached, and the Soviet acceptance of a new, sharply modified line, which yields all predominantly Polish areas to Germany.
These facts, together with many others, such as the extraordinary treatment of Foreign Minister Shukru Saracoglu of Turkey, who today as yesterday was left to cool his heels in the streets of Moscow, having achieved precisely nothing since he was received as an honored guest three days ago; the arrival of Herr von Ribbentrop without any knowledge of the Soviet program for him and his being left waiting on his arrival while the fate of Estonia was first settled with Karl Selter, her hapless Foreign Minister, all sharply contradict the facile theory that everything was cut and dried from the start and that the Russians in the meantime were simply playing a comedy for delusion of the public.
Constant Haggling Indicated
On the contrary, a study of the course of events suggests that both Russia and Germany have been constantly haggling and adopting and varying opportunist solutions of the situation throughout.
Although the wording of today’s communiques has produced confusion and an intense war psychosis among the Russian people, to whom no source of information is available save the official two newspapers. more sophisticated foreigners, after the first shock, are inclined to take the calmest view of the latest developments. The reference to consultation regarding “necessary measures’’ seems little more than a paper concession by Russia to Germany in exchange for obtaining a free hand in an area where Germany has so long fought her—the Baltic States.
Even if the Russians had to pay a further price by withdrawing from the advanced westerly line to which they had extracted German assent —and many question whether Russia was so much forced to yield ground, as Germany was informed Russia would not take over—the new reduced territory is an advantage to the Soviet both politically and militarily.
The former line was strategically vulnerable from East Prussia, and now the Soviet has minimized the risk of attack from there. Instead of including a big population of bitterly hostile, resentful and rebellious Poles—the Russians for many reasons remember that since the third partition of Poland her inhabitants have been skilled in conspiracy and rebellion—the Soviet is left with the homogeneous populations of the Polish Ukraine and Western White Russia, who had been severed from their Soviet relatives only since 1920. In view of their harsh treatment in Poland since then the Soviet may justifiably expect that, at the beginning anyway, they will welcome a change in regime.
More Rebellious Subjects
Germany, on the other hand, was allowed to add almost the whole Polish population to her already considerable collection of newly subjugated, rebellious and revengeful subjects. Furthermore, indignant Poles are contiguous to indignant Czechs and Slovaks, fellow-Slavs who have already buried their differences, as the latter are contiguous to indignant Austrians. All these are united further by the bond of Catholicism.
Joseph Stalin may certainly consider that he is well rid of a hotbed of future revolts and be well satisfied to leave the job of espionage, suppression and execution to the German secret police, especially as his own secret police are obviously going to have their hands full in dealing with the Polish bourgeoisie in the Ukraine and White Russia.
The chief impression that Germany’s new pacts make on neutral foreigners in Moscow is that they are an astonishing confession of Nazi weakness and distrust of Germany’s ability to face a long war. All that Herr von Ribbentrop has actually taken back to Berlin with him is the Soviet Union’s promise to sue for peace on Germany’s behalf and consult with her if, as seems certain. Communist Russia’s pleas to spare Hitlerism are ignored by the Allies.
To win this promise to sue for peace Germany has had to admit openly this unwarlike aim; has had to yield the Baltic States to Russia and has had to reward her with the permanent allotment of 11,000,000 people of kindred race, whom the Soviet Union has already Sovietized. To win this result Herr von Ribbentrop has had two nights and half days of such hard bargaining that even a double rendering of musical honors — without national anthems — and a sumptuous banquet at the Kremlin, enjoyed beside two Jewish Commissars, may hardly seem sufficient personal recompense.
How far has the mighty Foreign Minister fallen, In the view of many, from even the days of his first visit to Moscow last month, when this correspondent’s mild inquiry to Germans here as to whether Herr von Ribbentrop had had a meeting with Lazar M. Kaganovitch, Commissar for Heavy Industry, was met with the icy remark: “Perhaps you are unaware of the utter impossibility that the Russians, who have very fine feelings in such matters, should ask Herr von Ribbentrop to meet a Jew.”
It is of course entirely possible— though informed neutral opinion here much doubts it—that Herr von Ribbentrop may have received assurances that the ominous clause regarding consultation about “necessary measures’* will mean a full military alliance, with a Soviet declaration of war at Germany’s side against the Allies. It is difficult to see that this could bring substantial help to Germany beyond the bluff value of the present threat.
The value of Russia’s big and very new fleet of submarines—a highly technical arm—has yet to be proved. She might smuggle out a limited number from the Baltic to the North Sea and could work from Murmansk to the Far East. That, apart from giving supplies, to wich Russia is already committed to the extent of the limited available resources, is believed the sum total of her possible efforts, except, perhaps, the stirring up of Afgahanistan against India.
It is certain that in the view of a majority of Russians intervention on the side of fascist Germany is abhorrent; that not the slightest attempt has been made by the government to prepare them for it psychologically and that such intervention would put a strain on the loyalty of Russian Communists. What, then, has the Soviet Union achieved by the new encouragement to Germany?
The answer is precisely that—encouragement to Germany. That Germany should plunge ever deeper into the war, to her own ultimate destruction, seems to be the only clearly discernible and certainly natural aim of the Soviet’s policy toward her.
It must be stressed that the rigidly controlled press does not show any sign of preparing the people for such a tremendous and unwelcome change as plunging to war to support a power that they have long been taught to consider the supreme fascist aggressor and therefore their own deadliest enemy.
The declaration of Winston Churchill, British. First Lord of the Admiralty, that German war planes did not damage British warships was reproduced today impartially with the counter-statement of Field Marshal Hermann Goering of Germany, and much space was devoted to the war budget speech of Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer. The evening broadcast, however, featured the alleged unhappy conditions of the Finnish workers and returned to the usual Communist line of attacking the Japanese and supporting the Chinese in the Far Eastern war.
It is interesting that the map of the new frontier of Poland is entitled not “Boundary Between the U.S.S.R. and Germany’’ but “Boundary Between the Spheres of Influence of the U.S.S.R. and Germany in the Territory of the Former Polish State.”
Herr von Ribbentrop left for Berlin at 12:40 P. M. today after what proved to be a strenuous visit. From information published in the Soviet press the visit might have been one of pleasure save for a couple of hours of negotiations. Actually Herr von Ribbentrop, after last evening’s banquet at the Kremlin and visit to the ballet, returned to the Kremlin at 1 A. M. and continued his efforts for the new pacts with Mr. Molotoff until after 5 A. M.
At 10 A. M. the indefatigable Herr von Ribbentrop was up again and already visiting Augusto Rosso, the Italian Ambassador, to whom he communicated the results of the night’s labors. It is believed that Herr von Ribbentrop urged that Italy should associate herself in the forthcoming Soviet peace offensive on Germany’s behalf.
Then, since Moscow has no Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on which a visiting statesman might place a wreath and since the depositing of a wreath with a swastika badge at the tomb of Lenin is still a little more than the Russians could be expected to understand, Herr von Ribbentrop made what is apparently the equivalent complimentary gesture for visiting statesmen here; he paid a quick visit to the agricultural exhibition.
At 12:15 Herr von Ribbentrop arrived at the airdrome, where a now stereotyped party awaited him— Vladimir P. Potemkin, Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Vladimir Barkoff, chief of protocol; Ambassador Rosso and the top-hatted Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, and the embassy staff, all surrounded by the usual bodyguard of cap-wearing secret police agents. The same little speech was made by the commander of the same air infantry guard of honor, and the same not particularly appropriate Soviet marches, with scrupulous avoidance of the delicate “Horst Wessel Lied” and the “International” were played.
Visit Too Short, He Says
Before his departure Herr von Ribbentrop issued the following message:
“My stay in Moscow was again short, I am sorry to say, too short. The next time I hope I shall be able to stay longer. Despite the short visit, we have used the two days very well. The following points were clarified:
“One, German-Soviet Russian friendship has now been finally established.
“Two, the two nations will never again allow anybody to interfere in questions of Eastern Europe.
“Three, both States wish peace to be restored again and that England and France give up the quite senseless and hopeless fight against Germany.
“Four, should, however, war instigators in these countries keep the upper hand, Germany and Soviet Russia will know how to meet them.”
Herr von Ribbentrop further mentioned the economic plans on a grand scale decided on between the two governments. These, he said, will turn out to the advantage of both.
Finally, Herr von Ribbentrop declared that the negotiations had taken place in a specially friendly and lavish atmosphere.
“But above all,” he added, “I would like to mention the exceedingly hearty reception I received from the Soviet Government and especially from Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotoff.”